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Comment and Controversy II 
]. Morgan Kousser 
Are Political Acts Unnatural? 
Written history currently lacks a mainstream. Seeming to bob 
more violently than usual on numerous cross-currents-QUASSH 
(Quantitative Social .Scientific History), the new labor history, 
public history, the revival of narrative, etc.-the profession is 
awash in the flotsam and jetsali1 of agendas, campaigns, calls to 
arms, and condemnations. I admit to having contributed to the 
detritus, but believe it better that the craft be buffeted than that 
it float lazily and aimlessly or drift into scholarly backwaters. My 
article on restoring politics to political history, however, was less 
a manifesto or a critique of previous historical works than it was 
an attempt to chart more clearly a course which some seemed 
already to be taking, to warn that the political science party up 
ahead had run aground on certain. shoals, and to describe a possible 
destination of the journey. I did not mean to ban other trips to 
other places, and, of course, I have no power to do so. Although 
I welcome Bourke and DeBats' call to take new bearings before 
continuing the excursion, I believe that the route that they have 
plotted fails to take adequate account of certain figurative rapids 
and eddies. Let me begin by very quickly retracing, less meta-
phorically, my earlier map. 1 
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The attempt to relate divisions in society and trends in the 
socioeconomic structure to those in politics has always been, will 
remain, and should be one of the chief tasks of American history. 
Indeed, despite what I view as something of an overconcentration 
on the subject of the social correlates of electoral behavior during 
the 1960s and 1970s, readers of the journals have recently been 
admonished that "the interrelationship between politics and the 
social or class structure over the course of American- history" 
constitutes "one of the great neglected themes in American his-
torical thought." Further, they have been assured that, if the new 
labor historians will but turn some of their attention from the 
workbench to the political podium, "we may finally begin to 
bridge the distance between social and political history. "2 
Far from calling for the independence of political history 
from the study of other facets of existence, I sought merely to 
argue that electoral behavior was not the whole of politics-that 
historians seemed increasingly to be realizing once again that 
politics includes policy and its consequences as well-and to point 
out that the structure of political institutions and the actions of 
political elites (including bureaucrats and judges, as well as elected 
officials) often make a difference in determining what policies are 
adopted. Those who seek to examine society through the lens of 
politics must realize more than they sometimes seem to that that 
glass distorts. Consequently, the study of how institutions and 
elites refract society's desires and fail accurately to mirror its 
characteristics and changes in those traits is necessary for under-
standing both policy formation in general and in particular in-
stances in the past, as well as for learning how to interpret societal 
features from the political record. 3 
Bourke, DeBats, McDonald, McCormick, and I may not 
agree on everything, but all of us wish to place more emphasis 
than many historians have recently put on the policies which 
governments adopt, and we tend to see those policies not just as 
symbolic gestures to an inattentive electorate, but also, at least at 
2 Quotes are from Edward Pessen, "Social Structure and Politics in American History," 
American Historical Review, LXXXVII (1982), 1290; Sean Wilentz, "On Class and Politics 
in Jacksonian America," Reviews in American History, X (1982), 59- Correctives to Pessen's 
essay by Robert H. Wiebe and Michael R Katz are in American Historical Review, LXXXVII 
(1982), 1326-1335-
3 Cf. Lee Benson, "An Approach to the Scientific Study of Past Public Opinion," in his 
Toward the Scientific Study of History (Philadelphia, 1972), I 52-153. 
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times, as real decisions which significantly affect the distribution 
of power and welfare in society. If a few copywriters working 
separately can be said to have launched "a scholarly campaign," 
we at least all seem to be promoting similar product lines. 4 
Almost any historian, moreover, would acknowledge that 
Bourke and DeBats' Oregon development company episode is 
representative of a large number of nineteenth- and even twen-
tieth-century cases, although some would attach less importance 
to them than Bourke and DeBats (or I) would. Governments 
made and continue to make a great many important decisions on 
issues which do not divide citizens on party lines. Contemporary 
bipartisan "Sunbelt" and "Frostbelt" coalitions in Congress spring 
immediately to mind. Some choices, such as whether to promote 
exports, to subsidize agricultural research, or to reduce the dan-
gers of toxic wastes, seem hardly to divide the voters at all. It 
was only prudent and no doubt not unusual in the mid-nineteenth 
century to offer stock or directorships in companies which needed 
franchises from legislatures to influentials of competing political 
parties, and it is not unknown today for people who do business 
with governments to contribute to Democrats as well as Repub-
licans. 
Certainly the influence of regional or local interest groups 
ought to be studied. We should not necessarily assume that every 
issue at the local, state, and national levels splits the polity into 
the same subsets. Students of city councils or the state or national 
legislatures who aim to explain the policies which those bodies 
choose should not arbitrarily exclude undivisive votes from their 
analyses. As critics of pluralism in political science have been 
saying for years, it may be as important to consider "non-deci-
sions" as it is to examine decisions. If postbellum Oregonians, 
for instance, ceased to give automatic assent to pro-development 
policies, or if such initiatives became associated with one of the 
two parties, a thoughtful analyst would notice the contrast and 
4 In addition to the articles which Paul F. Bourke and Donald A. DeBats cite in "On 
Restoring Politics to Political History," in this issue, including Richard L. McCormick, 
"The Party Period and Public Policy: an Exploratory Hypothesis," journal of American 
History, LXVI (1979), 279-298, see Terence J. McDonald, "From Economics to Political 
Economy in the History of Urban Public Policy," journal of Urban History, VIII (1982), 
355-364; idem, "Comment," ibid., 454-462. See also the parallel call for more attention to 
the provision of urban public services in Jon C. Teaford, "Finis for Tweed and Steffens: 
Rewriting the History of Urban Rule," Reviews in American History, X (1982), 142-147. 
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offer an explanation for the change. Although we should never 
uncritically "recycle old political science" (or old economics or old 
sociology or old anything else), historians should never fail to 
exploit valuable insights from any source. 5 
Although recognizing that previous historians came to different 
conclusions than I did, Bourke and DeBats doubt that my inter-
pretation of the connection between late nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century southern black voting strength and the educa-
tional benefits that blacks and whites received would be "surpris-
ing" to "any mode ofhistorical analysis" or that historians would 
have needed "any new explanatory model" to arrive at the same 
result that I did. This view undervalues one of the chief tasks of 
QUASSH-formulating models explicitly and choosing between 
them on the grounds oflogic, evidence, generalizability, elegance, 
and simplicity. In the case of southern education, for instance, 
some historians have averred that paternalistic white politicians 
altruistically supported black education after disfranchisement, 
while a whole school of political scientists has insisted that public 
policies are mere functions of universal societal needs, the satis-
faction of which is constrained only by the availability of resources 
to fund programs. In "Restoring Politics" and in a less theoretical 
companion piece, I sought to bring these and other largely implicit 
models to consciousness, to reason about them, and to examine 
some evidence relating to them. Because these and related models 
are neither so obvious nor so simple as Bourke and DeBats imply, 
and because stating them formally may aid other historians of 
governmental policies, I offer a series of explicit models. 6 
5 Peter Bachrach, The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique (Lanham, Md., 1970). Cf. 
Ballard C. Campbell's decision, conventional in legislative roll call studies, to delete from 
his analysis non-divisive votes in his Representative Democracy: Public Policy and Midwestern 
Legislatures in the Late Nineteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass., 1980), 207. 
6 For an example of the paternalistic thesis, see, in addition to the works cited in my 
earlier article, H. Leon Prather, Sr., Resurgent Politics and Educational Progressivism in the 
New South: North Carolina, 1890-1913 (Madison, N.J., 1979); Dewey W. Grantham, in 
"The Contours of Southern Progressivism," American Historical Review, LXXXVI (1981), 
1050, asserts that the southern Progressive educational campaigns were motivated by 
reformers' interests in "social order, efficiency, and development as well as in social 
justice," presumably for blacks as well as whites. Kousser, "Progressivism for Middle-
Class Whites Only: The Distribution of Taxation and Expenditures for Education in 
North Carolina, 1880-1910," journal of Southern History, XLVI (1980), 169-194. 
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The Social Determinist model might be expressed, 111 regres-
sion analytic terms, as: 
, 
(I) y) = ~ b;;X ij + Cj Z j + U j ; 
• - I 
where i indexes an individual's characteristics; 
j indexes each individual; 
Y is a measure of government outputs received 
by/" individual; 
X,, ... , X, arc socioeconomic traits of each 
individual; 
{
1 if the individual performs some poli t ical act, 
/'.; = such as voting; 
0 o therw ise; 
bu and CiJ are coefficients to be estimated; and 
U, = an error term, w hich is assumed to have 
whatever desirable properties arc needed. 
The social determinist hypothesis is that c, = o. 
Equations such as (1) can be changed tO group models by 
conceiving of j as an index, not for individuals, but for each 
group, such as blacks and whites or rich and poor. Analysts 
concerned with the relative rather than the absolute level of ben-
efits received by each individual or group may replace Y; by 
(Y/~- ~ Y1 ). Different assumptions about the error term or the 
availability of different types of data for the dependent variable 
might dictate the usc of nonlinear rather than linear estimation 
techniques. Models containing interaction terms or allowing more 
than two values for Zj-for instance, abstention as well as voting 
for another party-could also be considered in th is and the suc-
ceeding d iscussion. 
A Prtre 1;'/ectora/ model might substitute (Y/'Z Y,) fo r Y; in 
equation ( 1) above, treat j as indexing groups, and be expressed 
as the hypothesis that 
Y, 
b,.J = 0. 
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That is, each group gets the same proportion of benefits as its 
proportion of votes. 
These polar cases only begin to suggest possible models. 
Consider four variations of a threshold model: 
where Di is a dummy variable, and all of the other variables are 
as defined above. Then a Winner Take All model expresses the 
view that 
D· = {1 if the party preferred by group j wins; 
1 0 otherwise. 
An instance would be an at-large electoral scheme in which voting 
is racially polarized and in which blacks are in a minority. In that 
case, they would elect no representatives. If, however, blacks 
composed part of a winning coalition, they could be expected to 
be rewarded with jobs and/or services, according to this model, 
approximately in proportion to their percentage in the population. 
A Large Groups Divide the Pie model says that 
{
1 if the group's proportion of votes is above some 
Di = threshold, say, 20%; 
0 otherwise. 
Further, instead of (Zi/~=1 Zi) in equation (2), we substitute 
[Zi(~=1 Zi- ~~=1 Zs)], where Zs represents the small subgroups 
of the population. Sine~ small subgroups, in this view, get left 
out of any benefits, the denominator should equal only the sums 
of the larger groups, instead of all the groups. For example, an 
ethnic group or a labor union might obtain some representation 
in appointive offices or on an electoral ticket if and only if they 
comprised a fifth or more of the voters. 
A third variation would replace Zj in equation (2) by 
(Zi~ Zi)· Now define [(V1j - Vzj)/(~f=1 Vki)] as the margin, in 
percentage terms, between the top two contending political par-
ties or candidates. A Balance of Power model would state that 
D· {;:::: 1 if (Z1.f~ Zi) > (V1j- V2/~ Vki) 
1 
= 0 otherwise. 
Formulating the model in this explicit fashion has the advantage 
that it makes clear that additional assumptions are needed. For 
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instance, the party or candidate which wins must be able to set 
the relevant governmental policy, and only a few groups-per-
haps only one group-can play the balance of power strategy for 
there to be a determinative outcome. If no group has a majority 
and all groups adopt this strategy and vote at the same time, then 
each and none provides the crucial votes, and the payoffs of each 
are unpredictable. 
A fourth theory, the Good Will model, treats D1 in equation 
(2) as a dictator, and argues that 
D· {;;::: 1 if the leader has good will toward group j, 
1 
= 0 otherwise. 
Some vanatlon of this model may underlie the "progressive-
paternalist" view of early twentieth century southern educational 
history. 
A User Fee model may be captured in the following equation: 
( ) }j _ Xm 3 ~ y. - B ~M X + UJ, 
"'- J "'-m=1 m 
where Xm = the amount of taxes paid by group j; the other 
variables have already been defined. This allocation theory ("You 
get what you pay for") is the one which southern governments 
appear to have adopted for educational expenditures shortly after 
blacks were disfranchised. Other models of allocation rules might 
be defined analogously. Consider a Redistribution model: 
}j _ Xm , (4) ~ y. - B ~M X X,+ [}_j 
"'- J "'-m=1 m 
where Xm = the income of all individuals in group j, 
X, = a redistribution rule; 
the other variables have already been explained. If X, really is 
redistributive, then B < o, or the richer the group, the smaller 
the proportion of benefits it receives. 
Other models and tests of them in particular cases could be 
conceived. Formulating and evaluating such models explicitly 
should be one of the chief immediate tasks of the developing 
historical literature on policy and institutional rules. That the 
educational example which I investigated briefly in "Restoring 
Politics" stimulated these formalizations provides some excuse for 
considering .that example. 
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But there are other reasons besides furthering an ongoing 
academic discussion for paying attention to a particular issue or 
set of issues; reflection on Bourke and DeBats' discussion suggests 
that it may be useful to try to categorize and evaluate some of 
these criteria. The first, used unreflectively by older style political 
historians, might be termed. the platform rule: those issues which 
politicians discussed are the important ones. Because issue stances 
may be symbolic or so compromised or ambiguous as to be 
meaningless, or because they may aim only at swing voters, while 
ignoring the particular politicos' safe base of voters as well as 
those obstinately committed to their opponents, this is much too 
simple a model. Nevertheless, platforms and speeches, critically 
examined, still play a necessary role in any model of a voter's 
decision calculus. If everyone were talking about secession and 
slavery in 1860, could northern voters have really ignored such 
issues and voted on the basis of the tariff or of liquor and anti-
popery? 
The second is the conflict criterion: the issues which split the 
voters and/or their representatives must be assumed to be the 
crucial ones. Yet, as pointed out earlier, this rule may exclude 
matters which are significant according to other standards. More-
over, some historians may prefer studying what united, rather 
than what divided people, and on what ultimate basis can we say 
that they are wrong? 
A third formula I have designated the law of effects: study 
those policies which had large impacts on politics or society. This 
principle presents two difficulties. The consequences of a policy 
may be difficult to discern, for the condition in question might 
have been produced by other causes, or the voters might not have 
clearly expressed their intention that the policy be adopted; con-
centrating on it would therefore necessarily disconnect electoral 
politics from policy formation. An example of the former is the 
double-digit inflation in the United States in 1980, which voters 
blamed on President Jimmy Carter, but which was produced in _, 
large measure by a rise in oil prices over which he could not 
possibly have exerted much control; the case of United States 
escalation of the war in Vietnam by erstwhile "peace candidate" 
President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1965 illustrates the latter. None-
theless, since many policies do have relatively clear consequences 
and are demonstrably related to electoral mandates, the impact 
rule remains the basic guide for choosing what to analyze. 
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The fourth or historicist standard focuses on the origins and 
development of policies which subsequently have important ef-
fects, such as the question of whether the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment meant to outlaw school segregation. This 
formula obviously runs the risk of elevating to major status con-
cerns which were minor at the time. 
Fifth, closely connected, and suffering from the same diffi-
culty, is the socially interesting facts rule, which allows one to con-
centrate on any policies which the analyst thinks significant, 
whether they received much attention in the electoral or legislative 
arenas or not. Prototypes of this criterion might include nine-
teenth-century abortion or obscenity laws or the myriad special 
incorporation laws such as Bourke and DeBats' Oregon devel-
opment company example. Since none of these criteria can com-
mand universal support, and since some relate policy less strongly 
to electoral politicS' or to the study of society or the economy 
than others do, the closeness of the connection between the de-
veloping historical study of policy and the other political and 
extra-political realms will depend on the number of instances in 
which historians employ each rule. 
In their speculative remarks Bourke and DeBats suggest that in 
nineteenth-century America, before the development of large 
professional bureaucracies, the decline in political participation, 
and the increase in the power of formally organized interest 
groups, the connection between societal pressure groups and pol-
icy outcomes was closer than it has been recently. Yet the current 
disconnection between electoral pressures and policy is not as 
great as Bourke and DeBats imply, and nineteenth-century poli-
tics was less "distinctive" than they maintain. California's Prop-
osition 13 and its counterparts in other states have rolled back 
taxes and governmental services rapidly and directly. The envi-
ronmental movement has greatly increased the attention which 
~ public authorities must pay to pollution, atomic power plant 
dangers, and unplanned growth. Nuclear freeze campaigns have 
emboldened politicians to attempt to slow the momentum of the 
arms race. It would be a considerable exaggeration to claim, 
furthermore, that efforts to give controversial moral preferences 
the force oflaw have entirely dissipated, and it is at least arguable 
that politics is no more secular now that it was a century or more 
ago. Consider the contemporary crusades of the anti-abortionists, 
476 I J. MORGAN KOUSSER 
the school prayer enthusiasts, and the opponents of "obscenity," 
all of which have nineteenth-century parallels. 
This is not to say that Bourke and DeBats are wrong about 
the increasing complexity of the policy process. It was precisely 
because of the comparative simplicity, openness, and decentralized 
nature of nineteenth-century American government that I urged 
focusing on that period as a means of beginning to understand 
more deeply the connections between electoral politics and policy. 
Nevertheless, I would take exception if, by stating that "political 
acts" were "indistinguishable" from those which citizens per-
formed in non-political roles, Bourke and DeBats are contending 
that the political structure and the actions of political elites did 
not even then affect the way in which the desires of social groups 
were translated into governmental policies. 
To be sure, abolition, temperance, Sabbatarian, anti-Catho-
lic, and other movements originated outside of politics. But they 
inevitably had to change when they entered politics. It was one 
thing to urge voluntary moral reform on individuals. Freely 
emancipating one's slaves or encouraging others to do so, swear-
ing off alcohol, abstaining from Sunday work, and converting .to 
active Protestantism involved only peer pressure, not legal coer-
cion. But when reformers sought to employ governmental power 
to compel others to act, they encountered institutional impedi-
ments to action, temporizing politicians who feared to alienate 
any substantial number of voters, and implacable resistance from 
other groups (slaveholders most importantly, but also immigrants 
whose cultural norms and traditions allowed drinking, honored 
"European" Sundays, and favored parochial schools). Federalism 
and constitutional restraints reduced abolition to free soilism, 
politicians' cautiousness often watered down prohibition into li-
cense laws, courts sometimes banned assaults on "natural rights," 
as in the 1855 Wynehamer case in New York, and the difficulties 
of enforcing compliance with Sunday "blue laws" led to their 
practical abandonment in many large cities. If moral reformers 
sought the transfiguration of society through political means, they 
soon found that the political process transfigured the nature and 
tactics of reform as well. 7 
7 In his recent fine summary of historical scholarship on legislatures, Joel H. Silbey, 
who generally adheres to the ethnocultural approach, nevertheless emphasizes the marked 
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Although I agree with Bourke and DeBats that the role of 
the state has grown, in fits and starts, throughout American 
history, and that policymaking has become more complicated, 
continuous, and centralized, their assertions that American politics 
has become more secular, less responsive to electoral currents, 
and less rooted in "the structures of social relations," seems du-
bious. As examples of pragmatic, often nonpartisan, amoral pres-
sure-group politics, it would be difficult to improve upon the 
nineteenth-century battles over tariff schedules or rivers and har-
bors, transportation subsidies, and banking laws, as, indeed, their 
Oregon example shows. To contend that the Progressive Era, 
with its prohibition and woman suffrage movements, its perva-
sive concern with corruption, its war to "make the world safe for 
democracy," and its coercive Americanization drives, exhibited 
fewer moral concerns than did Gilded Age politics is questionable. 
To assert that the class politics of the New Deal and Fair Deal 
failed to touch deep roots in the social structure would badly 
distort the historical evidence. To maintain that the civil rights 
and anti-Vietnam War struggles had no moral overtones would 
invite sarcasm. To argue that, in their statements and actions, 
politicians from competing parties differed from each other more 
sharply and honestly and on a greater range of issues in the last 
century than they do today is to substitute nostalgia for analysis. 
And it is surely the case that never in American history have we 
had two consecutive presidents who exposed their religious 
professions more regularly to the electorate than have Carter and 
Ronald Reagan. If revivalistic politics ever died, it has recently 
been born again. Even economic management has become less a 
matter of technical competence than of apparently unshakable 
beliefs in what is often referred to as the supply-side "religion" 
or, in its competing faith, the gospel of John Maynard Keynes, 
or, in what is doubtless at the core of these belief systems, the 
credos that government policies should primarily benefit the rich 
or, conversely, aid the rest of us. 8 
effect of institutions on policy. "Legislative voting behavior," he remarks, "is not the 
ritualistic recording of decisions made elsewhere." See his '"Delegates Fresh from the 
People': American Congressional and Legislative Behavior," journal of Interdisciplinary 
History, XII (1983), 604. 
8 On the progressives, McCormick, From Realignment to Reform: Political Change in New 
York State, I8g;-1910 (Ithaca, 1981); idem, "Party Period and Public Policy"; idem, "The 
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Empirical disputes about the degree of difference between 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century American politics aside, 
Bourke and DeBats seem to me to beg three theoretical questions 
in their basic approach to the social analysis of politics-an ap-
proach which is best encapsulated in their phrase about "the pol-
itics of natural settings and natural groupings." First, to speak in 
such terms is to assume, a priori, that organized, conventional 
politics is somehow unnatural and epiphenomenal per se. Yet to 
contend that a political group is necessarily less natural than a 
church, a lodge, a union, or a social class, each of which may 
include individuals who have vastly different experiences, tastes, 
and perceived self-interests, is to assert a very strong unstated 
theory that allows one to distinguish the real from the unreal. 
Was Tammany Hall less important to its members' lives than the 
Congregational church was to its parishioners? Was a man's ethnic 
identity more important to him than his partisan affiliation? 
Should such questions be finessed with a phrase? 
Second, even assuming, for the sake of argument, that social 
groups are more genuine than political groups, the question of 
which divisions of society are essential and which are artificial is 
heavily contested. If forced to choose, what allegiance would 
Bourke and DeBats announce-hard Marxist economic determin-
ism, soft Marxist cultural hegemony, Hegelian idealism, or Ben-
sonian "Marxist" ethnoculturalism? And how, apart from a leap 
of faith, would they justify their creed? To Beardeans as well as 
to such young Marxists as Wilentz, classes, defined for the first 
by the nature of their property and for the second by their relation 
to the means of production, are real, and the ethnoculturalists' 
history is of the consensus variety because it charts conflict only 
between superficially different aggregates of people. Since Wilentz 
seems to believe it wrong in principle to try to distinguish be-
Discovery that Business Corrupts Politics: A Reappraisal of The Origins of Progressiv-
ism," American Historical Review, LXXXVI (1981), 247-274; Daniel T. Rodgers, "In Search 
of Progressivism," Reviews in American History, X (1982), 113-132. On the growing party 
splits in Congress, see, e.g., Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, "The Polarization of 
American Politics," Social Science Working Paper #476, California Institute of Technol-
ogy (April, 1983). The theological pretensions of Reaganomics appear in George Gilder, 
Wealth and Poverty (New York, 1981), and the mundane reality in Frances Fox Piven and 
Richard A. Cloward, The New class War: Reagan's Attack on the Welfare State and Its 
Consequences (New York, 1982). 
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tween cultural and class interpretations or to argue from the only 
available evidence on how large numbers of men behaved polit-
ically-aggregated census and voting data-the rival Marxist and 
ethnocultural schools of the social history of politics disagree not 
only on questions about the nature of society, but also in their 
fundamental epistemological stances. Such disputes create appar-
ently unseen difficulties for Bourke and DeBats. 9 
~ Third, even if we knew that social groups were natural and 
which ones of them were, it would not necessarily follow that 
they were natural in politics, and, a fortiori, on every level of 
politics. In the first half of the twentieth century, most white 
Baptists and Episcopalians in the South appear to have voted their 
differing religions on the issue of prohibition, their common race 
on that of segregation, and their somewhat overlapping classes 
on economic matters. Nineteenth-century factory workers and 
owners often stood together along industry lines on the subject 
of the tariff, split on ethnic or religious bases on liquor, divided 
into class groups on questions of maximum hours or legalizing 
labor unions, and coalesced on a sectional basis on slavery and 
secessiOn. Which groupings in these shifting kaleidoscopes were 
natural? 
Some students of policy outputs in political science proved to 
their own satisfaction that electoral politics had so little effect on 
policies that an analyst oflaws and regulations could safely ignore 
voters and elections. In "Restoring Politics to Political History," 
I disagreed with that view, and argued that their work was the-
oretically sterile and methodologically flawed. That my critique 
of this position should be taken as a call for a research agenda 
which splits off the social or economic analysis of politics from 
the study of policy therefore seems ironic. On the contrary, I 
believe that we all are, or should be, social analysts of politics, 
economic analysts of politics, as well as political analysts of pol-
~ itics. But if political institutions and the actions of political elites 
9 Benson, "Group Cohesion and Social and Ideological Conflict: A Critique of Some 
Marxian and Tocquevillian Theories," American Behavioral Scientist, XVI (1973), 741-767; 
idem, "Marx's General and Middle-Range Theories of Social Conflict," in Robert K. 
Merton et a!. (eds.), Qualitative and Quantitative Social Research: Papers in Honor of Paul F. 
Lazarsjeld (New York, 1979), 189-209. Wilentz, "Class and Politics," 45-63. 
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are ignored or treated as a black box, complete with pinhole and 
film, which merely records without distortion what is before it 
when the opening is periodically uncovered, we will neither ob-
tain accurate pictures of society nor learn much about the process 
of policy development. 
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